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A B S T R A C T
As agents seeking to learn how to successfully navigate their environments, humans can both obtain knowledge
through direct experience, and second-hand through communicated beliefs. Questions remain concerning how
communicated belief (or instruction) interacts with ﬁrst-hand evidence integration, and how the former can bias
the latter. Previous research has revealed that people are more inclined to seek out conﬁrming evidence when
they are motivated to uphold the belief, resulting in conﬁrmation bias. The current research explores whether
merely communicated beliefs aﬀect evidence integration over time when it is not of interest to uphold the belief,
and all evidence is readily available. In a novel series of on-line experiments, participants chose on each trial
which of two options to play for money, being exposed to outcomes of both. Prior to this, they were exposed to
favourable communicated beliefs regarding one of two options. Beliefs were either initially supported or
undermined by subsequent probabilistic evidence (probabilities reversed halfway through the task, rendering
the options equally proﬁtable overall). Results showed that while communicated beliefs predicted initial choices,
they only biased subsequent choices when supported by initial evidence in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment.
Findings were replicated across contexts, evidence sequence lengths, and probabilistic distributions. This
suggests that merely communicated beliefs can prevail even when not supported by long run evidence, and in the
absence of a motivation to uphold them. The implications of the interaction between communicated beliefs and
initial evidence for areas including instruction eﬀects, impression formation, and placebo eﬀects are discussed.
Human beings, like the majority of animals, have the capacity to learn
how to interact with an environment through ﬁrst-hand experience of
action-outcome relationships. Although some animals have developed the
limited ability to communicate these relationships, such as primates,
dolphins and bees (Bradbury&Vehrencamp, 1998; Frisch, 1950), humans
have taken this ability to much higher levels. This transfer of knowledge can
be highly adaptive - we can for instance be informed that having a coﬀee
will cause us to feel more awake, and from this information choose to have
a coﬀee to realize this outcome, without having to start from scratch in
working out what might reduce our tiredness. Hence, the development of
language has allowed us to transfer information about action-outcomes with
an unparalleled capacity and ﬂexibility.
However, despite this communicative capacity, people still seem to
hold erroneous beliefs (e.g. the unsupported belief that vaccines cause
autism, or homeopathy), whether due to misinterpretations or percep-
tions of evidence in the communicator, or wilful deception. This
combination of erroneous or unsupported beliefs, and the capacity to
transfer (a capacity that is ever-increasing with the development of
technology, from the printing press to most recently the internet)
creates dangerous, viral eﬀects (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert,
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012), such as believing an otherwise treatable
disease should instead be treated homoeopathically. Such phenomena
provoke an obvious and critical question; why are such fallacious
beliefs adopted and maintained?
In the present paper, we provide one possible explanation. We argue
that when the truth value of a communicated belief is unclear, people
use experienced evidence to validate the belief. We demonstrate that in
such cases, evidence that is initially encountered will determine
whether a belief is consolidated or not, leading to potential bias when
this initial evidence is not representative in the long run. Consequently,
we believe the present work to be of particular relevance to the
literature on persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Petty & Cacioppo,
1984; Wood, 2000), source credibility (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Hahn,
Harris, & Corner, 2009), and instruction eﬀects (Doll, Jacobs,
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1. Learning via communication
While information about action-outcome relations has been widely
regarded to be represented in terms of associations (Hommel, Müsseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2002). This does not necessarily mean that such
representations are always formed by slow associative processes (i.e.,
Hebbian learning), which are, for instance, thought to underlie habit
formation (Custers & Aarts, 2010). They can also result through propo-
sitional processes (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), including
deduction, inference, and instruction. These allow for fast and ﬂexible
changes in associations as these propositions are hypotheses about the
state of the world that have a “truth value” and can therefore be
conﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed. Hence, while people may form action-
outcome representations slowly through repeated experiences, or via
deductive and inferential processes, they may also evaluate the truth
value of beliefs about these relations that are communicated by others.
Normative accounts, such as the Bayesian approach, argue that such
as evidence is experienced, the belief (and its truth value) is updated to
eventually reﬂect the “true” state of the evidence (Fischhoﬀ& Beyth-
Marom, 1983). Within such an approach, a communicated belief, if
regarding a new hypothesis, may be considered a “prior”. If such a prior
is not reﬂected by the distribution of evidence (i.e. the belief is
erroneous), then with suﬃcient evidence, the eﬀect of the prior would
be gradually overruled by experienced evidence. Critically, this high-
lights the two, interlinked elements that might explain recipients still
possessing an erroneous belief: Either the recipient is yet to experience
suﬃcient evidence, or the individual is overconﬁdent in the prior
(although the latter makes the former more likely). Importantly,
Bayesian accounts would predict, provided suﬃcient evidence, that
not only should beliefs converge on the “truth” (dictated) by evidence,
but that once converged, beliefs should remain there.
However, humans have been found to deviate from this normative
standard of learning. Research into cognitive biases has instead shown
systematic misinterpretations of evidence (Bar-Eli, Avugos, & Raab,
2006; Gilovich, 1983; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), and failures to adjust beliefs accurately
(Abbott & Sherratt, 2011; Dave &Wolfe, 2003; Dennis & Ahn, 2001;
Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroﬀ, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) across
many domains of learning (for a review, see Pohl, 2004). In particular
regard to erroneous belief maintenance, one explanation is an over-
weighting of belief-congruent evidence, known as a conﬁrmation bias
(Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998).
2. Communication and conﬁrmation bias
Conﬁrmation bias is an umbrella term that covers a number of both
cognitive and motivational processes (Hahn &Harris, 2014). The
impact of these processes is functionally equivalent in terms of the
topic of the present paper; it is the retention of an erroneous belief
through the overweighting of belief-congruent evidence. We now
brieﬂy highlight some of these (at times competing) motivational and
cognitive explanations, with a view to demonstrate the importance of
assessing the impact of beliefs in the absence of such motivations and
cognitive strategies. In doing so, we forward an account of conﬁrmation
bias in (erroneous) belief maintenance that is at its heart a consequence
of an asymmetry in the way evidence is integrated. This integrative bias
occurs irrespective of directional motivation (e.g. Kunda, 1990) or
skewed evidence exposure (see Klayman &Ha, 1987; Nickerson, 1998)
explanations commonly associated with erroneous belief acquisition.
Such eﬀects are instead shown to be dependent upon evidence order in
the immediate attempted validation of the belief.
2.1. Motivated reasoning
Research in motivated reasoning has argued that directional motiva-
tions, such as social conformity (Asch, 1955; Cialdini & Goldstein,
2004) and self-concept preservation (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) play a role
in conﬁrmation bias eﬀects (Klein & Kunda, 1989; Kunda, 1990). For
example, were asked to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of arguments either
in favour of, or opposed to, the death penalty (Lord, Ross, & Lepper,
1979). Participants pre-existing political, ethical, and social motiva-
tions behind their particular opinion, led to more positive evaluations
of arguments that favoured their prior opinion. This was taken as
evidence that people are motivated to uphold their personal beliefs
when evaluating arguments.
When focusing on the eﬀects of communicated beliefs regarding
action-outcome relationships, many of these directional motivations
contribute to the conﬁrmation bias eﬀect (Klayman, 1995;
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) in a complex fashion that raises
problems for an experimental setting. That is, a communicated belief
(e.g., a homeopathic medicine works) may bias evidence integration
because it interacts with other needs (such as self-preservation). In
other words, the resulting conﬁrmation bias may not directly reﬂect the
communicated belief, but be motivated by the individual's associated
needs. Although motivations may attribute to greater degrees of bias,
and granted the diﬃculty in removing all elements of motivated
reasoning from real world situations (Yarritu, Matute, & Vadillo,
2013), we posit that merely hearing about a belief is enough to bias
evidence integration. Accordingly, such an argument rests on a
cognitive explanation.
2.2. Cognitive account
How could a communicated belief lead to conﬁrmation bias eﬀects
even in the absence of these motivations? The removal of directional
motivations can help clarify the remaining mechanisms at the heart of
belief biasing eﬀects. Such a removal has been posited, through work
investigating the interaction between motivated reasoning and cogni-
tive processes (Hahn &Harris, 2014; Kunda, 1990), to result in less use
of sub-optimal cognitive processes, which might otherwise be selec-
tively employed to favour the motivated outcome. These (biasing)
processes can be divided into two camps, ﬁrst order (or input based) and
second order (or integration based) accounts (MacDougall, 1906).
First order accounts of conﬁrmation bias can be categorized in terms
of selective choices, such as positive test strategies (Klayman &Ha,
1987; Wason, 1960), selective search (an asymmetry in the scrutiny
applied to arguments; see Lord et al., 1979) based, or natural
asymmetries in exposure, such as illusory correlations
(Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Fiedler & Krueger, 2011). In all such cases,
as an individual learns action-outcomes from experiences, if the
evidence seen favours conﬁrmation (whether through purposeful strat-
egy, or a naturally skewed environment), any resultant bias could be in
part (or entirely) due to this asymmetry in evidence exposure. In other
words, if selective information intake is possible within an environ-
ment, one cannot discern whether the biasing eﬀect of a communicated
belief is due to an asymmetry in the valuation of conﬁrmatory evidence
over contradictory (Klayman, 1995), or due to the asymmetrical
exposure to conﬁrmatory evidence (or a combination of the two).
Importantly, if selective exposure is the result of one's own actions
(rather than pre-determined by the environment), it can be argued that
the asymmetry of selection is due to the asymmetry in evaluation (i.e.
integration; Klayman, 1995; MacDougall, 1906). Accordingly, by pre-
cluding selective exposure explanations, it is possible to determine if
conﬁrmation bias eﬀects in erroneous belief maintenance may depend
upon the skewed integration of evidence alone.
Second order (integrative) accounts of conﬁrmation bias have been
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seen by theorists as hierarchically responsible for selective strategy use
(Klayman, 1995; MacDougall, 1906). The integrative account of con-
ﬁrmation bias posits that conﬁrmatory evidence is valued asymmetri-
cally over contradictory evidence. Put another way, despite both
conﬁrmatory and contradictory evidence being integrated, the former
is systematically over-weighted relative to the latter. Evidence for the
over-weighting of conﬁrmatory and underweighting over contradictory
evidence has been found in work on conﬁrmation bias (Gilovich, 1983;
Klayman, 1984, 1995) and information distortion (Nurek,
Kostopoulou, & Hagmayer, 2014). Such work has found support from
reinforcement learning (Decker, Lourenco, Doll, & Hartley, 2015; Doll,
Hutchison, & Frank, 2011; Doll et al., 2009; Staudinger & Büchel, 2013)
and neuroimaging studies (Whitman et al., 2015). The latter of which
has demonstrated such an integrative bias is a consequence of the
asymmetry between the updating signal that occurs when evidence
matches an established pattern of neural connections versus the signal
from evidence-pattern mismatches. Put another way, conﬁrmatory
evidence conﬁrms (and updates) an established pattern, whilst contra-
dictory (or pattern mismatched) evidence has no equivalent pattern to
update (i.e. there is no equivalent “null” pattern that incongruent
evidence can update in kind).
When hypotheses are self-generated, there is an initial period of
sensitivity as the hypothesis is formed and tested, leading to primacy
eﬀects. Evidence for this been found in judgements of causal strength
(Dennis & Ahn, 2001; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003) and information
distortion (Blanchard, Carlson, &Meloy, 2014; DeKay, Miller,
Schley, & Erford, 2014; Nurek et al., 2014). Alternatively, when an
individual is instead presented with a hypothesis second-hand,
although the formation process may be absent, there is still an initial
sensitivity due to the hypothesis being yet untested. However, unlike
self-generated hypotheses, when evaluating a communication, there is
an implied relationship to the credibility of its source (Hahn et al.,
2009), such that cues indicating the reliability of a source impact the
perceived validity of the communication. In this way, source cues may
result in circumvention of initial sensitivity.
However, when a belief is communicated in the absence of source
cues, then we argue that early experiences, previously demonstrated to
be pivotal in hypothesis formation processes (Anderson, 1965;
Dennis & Ahn, 2001), are instead required to validate the belief.
Further, by removing source cues such as aﬃliation with the source
(Frost et al., 2015), and perceived expertise (Goodwin, 2011; Harris,
Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2015; Walton, 1997), the resulting motivational
and cognitive explanations for conﬁrmation bias (e.g., the belief was
communicated by a friend, whom one is motivated to agree with) are
reduced. Such a reduction distances the present work from literatures
including argumentation (Hahn et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2015),
attitude change and persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2009;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Priester & Petty, 1995), in which source cues
are themselves taken as evidence with a truth value. Such work has
typically indicated the eﬃcacy of an argument (or belief) as dependent
upon other truth-value assessments of source cues, which interact with
an individual's priors (e.g., a prior attitude or opinion).
3. Truth values, integrative bias, and instruction eﬀects
Propositions, which communicated beliefs may be considered to be,
imply a truth value (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Whilst associations, in
their unqualiﬁed activation links are the state of the world (Shanks,
2007), propositions are statements regarding the state of the world, and
can thus diﬀer in their accuracy. How truth values may then interact
with evidence is therefore of interest - how do people treat such
information, especially if its value is uncertain?
Work in instruction eﬀects has typically looked at the impact of
formal instruction (notably from an experimenter source) on automatic
processes, such as approach-avoidance (Van Dessel et al., 2016) and
task-rule congruency eﬀects (Liefooghe et al., 2012). In the present
work, we play oﬀ the inherent uncertainty of truth values of commu-
nicated beliefs (i.e. instructions) by pitting evidence against the
instruction. This introduces new questions that cannot be assessed
when evidence and instructions are in line. For example, this allows for
the investigation of the impact of order eﬀects on instruction eﬃcacy on
longer, more deliberative learning processes. The present work seeks to
provide a novel contribution in this manner, by demonstrating that the
presentation of a hypothesis (or instruction), even incidentally commu-
nicated (i.e. without complementary directional motivations), shapes
how evidence is then integrated over time. Further, we argue that
instruction eﬀects do not depend upon directional motivations (such as
authority eﬀects).
4. Present research
The approach of the present work bears a parallel to previous
research in the Judgement and Decision Making literature, which has
focused on the roles of communicated (termed ‘description’) and
experienced evidence as advice-taking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006;
Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Typically, these paradigms have used binary
choices between risky (probability of high reward or nothing) and safe
(guaranteed low reward) gambles, in which participants must use either
their own experience or on descriptions of the choices provided by the
experimenter (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Newell & Rakow, 2007;
Rakow&Newell, 2010). Although, this ﬁeld has recently started
investigating direct competition between these two forms of informa-
tion (Weiss-Cohen, Konstantinidis, Speekenbrink, & Harvey, 2016),
methods typically incur potential experimenter demand eﬀects
(Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008; but for a notable exception, see Yaniv,
2004), which introduces unaccounted for directional motivations.
Further, the use of 1:1 description to evidence ratios (each choice re-
introduces experimenter instruction, leading to potential over-weight-
ing) and quantiﬁed statements (e.g., “60% chance to win $2”) rather
than more ecologically valid, relational, action-outcome beliefs, (i.e.
generic, unquantiﬁed statements; Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010;
Gilovich, 1993; Leslie, 2008) separates this literature from the present
research.
Instead, the line of research developed here looks to implant a
communicated belief in a manner that allows for uptake in the reduced
presence of additional motivations (such as experimenter or authority
eﬀects). Through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an on-line
lottery context was used in which participants were told they would
be choosing between two lotteries repeatedly, trying to generate the
greatest overall payment. A novel manipulation was designed that
communicated beliefs through an on-line “comment section” prior to
the task. Participants were shown anonymous comments from “pre-
vious players” regarding the task, under the guise that they could add
their own comments once they had ﬁnished making their choices, with
the aim of providing information to both the task developers and other
players. The “previous players” comments were in fact generated by the
task itself, with most being neutral in nature, whilst those in the belief
conditions contained a directional hypothesis. Participants were taken
through ﬁlter questions at the end of the experiment to ensure they had
not seen through the manipulation. Such a manipulation provided a
novel, ecologically current form of communicating a belief that avoids
aforementioned motivation pitfalls (Kunda, 1990), as participants
believed they were simply playing a game with a monetary incentive.
Following this manipulation was a series of binary choices between
the two lottery machines. One of the two machines (unknown to the
participants) would start oﬀ as the probabilistically dominant option for
a number of trials, before these probabilities then reversed, known as a
probabilistic reversal (Peterson & DuCharme, 1967). Having a reversal
of evidence resulted in three between subject groups: a control group
(received no communicated belief), a belief group that received initial
supportive evidence (BiS group), and a belief group that received
initially undermining evidence (BiU group). All groups saw the same
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two-sided evidence. That is, all participants saw exactly the same
evidence for the two options (which had equal outcomes overall), only
the order of these outcomes was pseudo-randomised to create two
“phases” in which one option dominates the other.
4.1. Hypotheses
The design outlined above allows for several predictions to be
tested, discerning between potential accounts. Importantly, both the
belief manipulation and evidence presentation aim to improve upon
previous research by reducing aforementioned directional motivations
and selective evidence exposure, both of which add unwanted alter-
native explanations for any subsequent bias. The use of a reversal
additionally allows for the demonstration of ongoing learning. If
participants are sensitive to reversals, between-group deviations can
be said to result from a biased active learning process, rather than due
to a gradual lapse in attention over time to new evidence.
While normative accounts of learning predict that people's choices
should be dictated by communicated beliefs at ﬁrst, they also assume
that these beliefs are updated based on experience evidence, so that
over time the communicated belief is washed out and the new belief
reﬂects the evidence (i.e. a normative account). There are several ways,
though, it which lasting biased could manifest itself. First, if people put
too much trust in the communicated belief, even a lot of contradicting
evidence may not be enough to erase this strong prior belief (a “strong
prior” account). Second, people may put not enough trust in the
evidence, failing to update their beliefs appropriately (a conservatism
account; see Phillips & Edwards, 1966; Pitz, Downing, & Reinhold,
1967). We argue, however, based on insights from source credibility
work (Chaiken &Maheswaran, 1994; Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 2012;
Harris et al., 2015), order eﬀects in hypothesis testing (Anderson, 1965;
Dennis & Ahn, 2001; Nurek et al., 2014), and integrated conﬁrmation
bias accounts (Klayman, 1995; MacDougall, 1906; Whitman et al.,
2015), that as a communicated belief is likely to require validation, its
inﬂuence will be dependent upon initially supporting evidence. In this
case, eﬀects of communicated beliefs and initial evidence are thought to
interact, wherein too much trust is put in the belief once it is conﬁrmed
by evidence, leading to a conﬁrmatory bias in evidence integration.
5. Experiment 1
5.1. Method
Following the outline set out in the present research. Experiment 1
was designed using an 80-20 probabilistic reversal with 100 trials each
side of the reversal, resulting in 200 trials in total. These trials were
preceded by the aforementioned “comment section” which contained a
communicated belief for the manipulation groups (“Machine A seemed
luckier to me”), with the remainder (and for the control group, the
entirety) of the comments of a neutral nature (e.g., “fun task”, “seemed
interesting”).
5.1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited and participated online through MTurk.
Those eligible for participation had a 95% and above approval rating
from over 500 prior HITs. Participants completed the experiment under
the assumption the purpose of investigation was general gambling
behaviors when using multiple lotteries. Participants were English
speakers between ages 18 and 65, located in the United States.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants in all experiments.
5.1.2. Design
Two lottery machines, labelled A and B, that both generated six
number outcomes were used as choice context (see Appendix A for an
example trial output). The instructions given to participants explained
that each machine uses a unique algorithm, based on the hyper-
geometric distribution of outcomes intrinsic to most modern lotteries
(Stern & Cover, 1989).
The order of outcomes between the two machines were structured
into two phases of 100 trials. For the ﬁrst phase 1 machine yielded 80%
of the “wins” - classiﬁed as providing an outcome better than the
alternative (e.g., machine A has one ball that matches the ticket, whilst
machine B has two balls that match the ticket, so machine B has
“won”), whilst the other yielded “wins” 20% of the time. During the
second phase these probabilities reversed. Hence, the overall propor-
tion of outcomes matched the natural probabilities of the hyper-
geometric distribution found in 6 ball lotteries. Within each phase the
order of outcomes was randomized. Which machine started oﬀ domi-
nant was counterbalanced between participants. In line with the natural
odds, 20% of trials were consequently uninformative as they involved
draws (0-0, 1-1, 2-2) between the two machines, the remaining
diagnostic trials (80%) followed the aforementioned probabilistic
reversal.
5.1.3. Procedure
Before starting the trials, participants were shown a “comment
section” in which previous participants had written their thoughts
regarding the task. These comments were rigged to appear to be from
other MTurk participants (complete with fake MTurk ID numbers), and
were of a hypothesis neutral nature (“interesting task.”, “good fun,
thanks!”). For the belief conditions, instead of all comments being
neutral (as in the control condition), the top comment was a commu-
nicated belief regarding the two machines (“I felt that machine A(B)
was much luckier!”).
On each trial participants pressed a button that generated a “ticket”
of three numbers, and then chose a machine to gamble with on each
trial. Participants were invited to earn as many points as possible, based
on the number of matches between their “ticket” and their chosen
machine. Each trial cost participants one point, so a failure to match
any numbers resulted in a net loss of −1 point, whilst a single ball
matched earned 2 points, 2 balls matches earned 8 points, and 3 balls
matched earned 50 points, reﬂected the increasing rarity of these
outcomes (see Appendix A for an example feedback screen). Partici-
pants were aware of their current total points earned during the trials,
and instructed that their total amount of points directly corresponded to
an increasing bonus payment in dollars (e.g., passing the 50 point
threshold increased the standard payment by 10%, then passing the 100
point threshold increased the payment by a further 15% of the standard
payment, for a total of a 25% bonus, and so on).
For each trial, once participants had generated their ticket of
numbers and selected a machine with which to gamble, participants
then pressed a button to generate the outcomes for that trial. Each
machine drew 6 balls, numbered from 1 to 49, with a new draw for each
trial. Matches between the numbers of the participant and the selected
machine were highlighted in green, whilst the forgone matches of the
non-selected machine were highlighted in red.
Once participants had completed all gambles, demographics were
ﬁlled out, along with questions regarding how often the participants felt
they had chosen optimally, and how often they felt the other machine
had provided a better outcome. Participants were also asked about the
probabilities of each outcome for each of the machines, along with a
brief questionnaire assessing various known correlates of superstition
and gambling behaviours; locus of control (Levenson, 1973), the
revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk &Milford, 1983) items con-
cerning luck, and neuroticism. Finally, participants completed a series
of exit funnel questions to assess awareness of the comment section
manipulation. Following completion of the task, participants were
debriefed and given an email to contact if they had any further
questions.
The main dependent variables under investigation were the propor-
tion of choices made in favour of the initially dominant machine. We
hypothesised that the BiS group (who receive initial support for the
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belief) would select the initially dominant machine in phase 1 (pre-
reversal) signiﬁcantly more than controls, and further, that this
diﬀerence would persist into phase 2 (post-reversal). For the BiU group
(who do not receive initial support for the belief), several aspects of
communicated biasing eﬀects became possible to test:
Firstly, phase 1 could demonstrate whether the communicated
belief acts as a strong prior (i.e. the belief is given a very high value
that takes a large amount of evidence to over-rule), which would result
in the BiU group signiﬁcantly diﬀering in their proportion of choices
relative to controls, favouring their belief indicated machine, in spite of
its initial sub-optimality.
Secondly, for phase 2, two possible eﬀects could occur in the BiU
group: either the BiU group would favour the now dominant machine
(which matches their communicated belief) more so than controls
(which leads to a linear eﬀect of condition in phase 2), or the BiU group
would have refuted the belief and would be no diﬀerent from controls
in phase 2.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Descriptives and processing
The 400 participants recruited were US based, randomized into
either the BiS (161), BiU (137) or control (102) conditions. The mean
age was 35.52 years (48% female). The data were gathered in two
stages: an initial run of 80 participants, with just the BiS and control
groups allowed for an estimate of the power needed when also adding
the BiU group (to test additional predictions) in run 2. This power
analysis, using G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was run using the smallest eﬀect size
of the dependent variables of interest, and indicated that to detect a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition at the .05 level with 80% power would
require an average group size of 91. For the two manipulation
conditions this number was multiplied by about 1.5 to compensate
for failures in passing the manipulation check (mentioned below),
resulting in a total N of 360. Given the unknown nature of the
additional BiU group, this was conservatively increased by 10% to
400. An ANOVA analysis was run, using experiment number as a
covariate, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerences of experiment number on
all dependent variables.
After completing the task, all participants were asked a series of
ﬁlter questions to determine whether the cover story (comments
originating from other participants, rather than the experimenter)
was believed, culminating in a check of whether the comment
manipulation had been remembered.1 If participants had no recollec-
tion of a manipulation comment (if one was presented in their
condition), they were removed from subsequent analysis,2 leaving
110 in the BiS group (75% pass rate) and 81 in the BiU group (59%
pass rate). The decision to remove those who failed to remember was
taken to reduce noise in further analysis break downs, speciﬁcally when
breaking down the analysis into phases, participants who failed this
check added a large amount of variance when analysing at a ﬁner level.
Furthermore, by removing those who fail the manipulation check, it is
possible to better ensure possible diﬀerences between groups in
remaining participants (notably for the BiU group) were not due to
failures in memory or registering the manipulation in the ﬁrst place.
The diﬀerence in the proportion of those who failed to remember
the manipulation between groups was not signiﬁcant. The remaining
293 participants (49% female), average age 35.12 years (SD= 12.08),
were used for the analyses below.
5.2.2. Correlates
Locus of Control, age, gender, gambles per week and revised
Paranormal Belief Scale (rPBS) variables were not correlated with any
of the dependent variables.3
5.2.3. Choice data
The key dependent variables used in the analysis were the total
proportion of choices made in favour of the initially dominant machine,
and the proportion of these choices made broken down by phase
(shown in grey in Fig. 1).
A series of ANOVA tests were conducted to determine the main
eﬀects of condition and phase on the proportion of choices made.
Signiﬁcant eﬀects of condition, F(2, 289) = 5.041, p= 0.007, and
phase, F(1, 289) = 137.84, p < 0.001, were found on the proportion
of choices made in favour of the initially dominant machine. The
interaction term between phase and condition was not signiﬁcant.
A series of pairwise comparisons between groups both overall and
within each phase was conducted to break down the main eﬀect of
condition. These comparisons found the BiS group to be signiﬁcantly
higher than both controls, F(1, 211) = 4.804, p= 0.029, η2 = 0.022,
and BiU groups, F(1, 190) = 8.579, p= 0.004, overall. Furthermore,
when broken down by phase, the BiS group was signiﬁcantly higher
than the BiU group in both phase 1, F(1, 190) = 5.152, p= 0.024, and
phase 2, F(1, 190) = 4.401, p= 0.037, whilst the diﬀerence between
BiS and controls did not reach signiﬁcance for phase 1, F(1, 211)
= 1.697, p= 0.194, η2 = 0.008, or phase 2, F(1, 211) = 3.733,
p= 0.055, η2 = 0.018.
The diﬀerences between the BiU and control groups were not
signiﬁcant overall (p= 0.329), in phase 1 (p= 0.318) or phase 2
(p= 0.632),4 a trend that is evidenced in the phase lines (grey) of
Fig. 1, suggesting that the undermined belief is abandoned. Visual
inspection of the choice data suggested that the BiU group are no
diﬀerent from controls, whilst the BiS group is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the two, in line with the hypothesis that biasing eﬀects of a
second-hand belief relies on exposure to initially supporting evidence.
This was further corroborated by the pairwise comparisons, leading to
the development of a post-hoc contrast code analysis.
5.2.4. Post-hoc contrast code formation
Accordingly, to test whether the BiU group were no diﬀerent than
controls in comparison to the BiS group, a contrast code ANOVA was
conducted (BiS, Control, BiU: 2,−1,−1). The contrast code analysis of
overall choice proportion was signiﬁcant, F(1, 289) = 9.535,
p= 0.002, η2 = 0.032, demonstrating a signiﬁcantly higher number
of choices in the BiS group as compared to both control and BiU groups.
Breaking this down by phase, (as illustrated by the grey lines in
Fig. 1), the contrast code persisted in both phase 1, F(1, 289) = 4.509,
p= 0.035, η2 = 0.015, and phase 2, F(1, 289) = 6.077, p= 0.014,
η2 = 0.021, again demonstrating a signiﬁcantly higher number of
choices in the BiS group as compared to both control and BiU groups.
The interaction between phase and contrast code was not signiﬁcant
(p= 0.676).
1 The exact phrasing of this question was “Do you think comments were biased towards
one machine?”, with options of A, B, or No. If participants selected “No”, this was deemed
grounds for removal. The question was preceded sequential exposure to ﬁrst the question
“Did you notice anything funny about the start of the experiment?” (open text response),
to assess if participants suspected the cover story, followed by “Was there anything that
inﬂuenced you regarding the previous participant comments?” (open text response).
2 Signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found with all participants included between conditions
on the overall proportion of choices, F(2, 399)=4.291, p=0.014, η2=0.021, and the
subsequent contrast coding of the same analysis, F(1, 396)=8.185, p=0.004, η2=0.02.
This pattern of results is explained further in the main eﬀects section.
3 Due to a minor programming error, one counterbalance condition had a slight
imbalance in the number of 2 ball matches in the second phase on one machine. To
remove possible issues, counterbalancing was used as a covariate in all further analyses,
as the counterbalancing factor was not exactly even across groups.
4 Bayesian T-tests of these pairwise comparisons were conducted using the JASP
statistical programme (JASP Team, 2016), using a uniform prior across possible models
(as used across all subsequent Bayesian analyses unless speciﬁed otherwise). Substantial
support was found for the null for overall, BF10=0.249, phase 1, BF10=0.259, and phase
2, BF10=0.178, in accordance with the< 1/3rd cut oﬀ recommendation (Dienes, 2014).
T.D. Pilditch, R. Custers Acta Psychologica xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
5.2.5. Phase 1 convergence
Visual inspection suggested that by the end of phase 1 participants
had all converged towards the dominant machine. To test this, a
repeated measures ANOVA of contrast coded condition (between
subjects) × 10 trial epochs (10 in total) within-subjects was conducted.
The consequent interaction between epoch and contrast code was
signiﬁcant, F(2, 290) = 5.657, p= 0.004, η2 = 0.038, indicating a
convergence of the contrast eﬀect over the course of the phase.5
5.3. Discussion
Several conclusions follow from these results. As can be seen from
Fig. 1, there is a strong eﬀect of reversal, indicating that learning is
ongoing in all groups. As such diﬀerences between groups are unlikely
to be due to task disengagement and instead suggest participants were
attentive to changes in the evidence. It should also be noted that this
sensitivity to reversal was present in all three groups, which indicates
the phase 2 contrast eﬀect is not due to the BiS group no longer being
attentive to any changes in evidence. In line with this, the convergence
of all groups during the ﬁrst phase suggests that the contrast eﬀect
during this phase could be due to starting point diﬀerences between the
BiS and other groups. However, the subsequent re-emergence of the
contrast eﬀect in the second phase indicates that the eﬀect of the belief
seen in phase one has not been washed out by the evidence, and instead
the BiS group's belief is still playing a role in biasing the integration of
subsequent evidence, relative to the other groups.
This convergence is one indicator that a conservatism explanation of
bias does not ﬁt across the three groups as well as suggesting that a
strong prior explanation for the eﬀect of the communicated belief is not
appropriate. This leads to the ﬁnal, and most important conclusion of
Experiment 1: even with the presence of 2-sided evidence, and the
reduction of motivational explanations of conﬁrmation such as experi-
menter demand eﬀects (along with the introduction of a competing
(against belief adherence) accuracy incentive), it is initial evidence that
dictates a belief's subsequent biasing eﬀects. The immediate mapping of
the initially undermined (BiU) manipulation group onto the control
group suggests that initial evidence is needed to consolidate a commu-
nicated belief. It is important to further note that given the manipula-
tion check criteria, the similarity between the BiU group and control
group in the analyses was not due to participants in the BiU group
having forgotten the communicated belief. This suggests that those in
the BiU group have refuted their communicated belief, and are thus
unaﬀected by it, even when the evidence changes to support it.
Consequently, the most suitable explanation for the eﬀect of a commu-
nicated belief on evidence is initially supportive evidence is required to
consolidate the belief, but once consolidation has occurred, learning is
still active, but biased to favour conﬁrmation when interacting with
subsequent evidence.
There are several limitations pertaining to Experiment 1. Firstly, the
contrast analysis for Experiment 1 was post-hoc, and therefore requires
replication. Secondly, the probability distributions used in the tasks
may have been too strong. By having an 80/20 probability distribution,
the dominance of one machine over the other was clear to all groups (as
evidenced in Fig. 1) demonstrated by their convergence during phase 1.
All groups were also able to detect the reversal that occurred at trial
100, which is not unsurprising given the severity of the reversal, as the
initially dominant machine becomes 60% worse in combination with
the counterfactual showing the dominance of the alternative. This may
have led to ceiling eﬀects in the number of choices between manipula-
tion groups and controls, that might have been teased apart better by a
more uncertain environment.
Returning to the literature on conﬁrmation bias eﬀects, this may
have led to an increased plausibility of alternative hypotheses that
allowed manipulation groups to negate the validity of the second-hand
belief (Klayman, 1995), muting the eﬃcacy of a bias that might
otherwise have persisted under uncertainty.
6. Experiment 2
Accordingly, the purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the
exploratory contrast eﬀect of Experiment 1 a priori, improving upon the
design given prior limitations.
6.1. Method
The design and procedure followed that of Experiment 1, with the
following changes outlined below.
Firstly, despite the intriguing potential real world ramiﬁcations of
the eﬀect that such a small intervention can have on updating, a
stronger manipulation (increasing the number of comments indicating
Fig. 1. Black lines show the within-group 7 trial windowed averages of proportion of choices made in favour of the initially dominant machine as participants move through the 200 trials
(with reversal occurring at 100 trial point), averaged on an individual level, then split into group averages. Grey lines show the averaged proportions of choices for each group, split by
phase. Standard errors for phases are also shown.
5 This was further ratiﬁed by Bayesian ANOVAs conducted on both the ﬁrst and last
epochs, to assess the strength of support for the contrast eﬀect in the ﬁrst epoch, and the
strength for the null in the ﬁnal epoch. Decisive evidence was found for the contrast eﬀect
in the ﬁrst epoch, BF10=149.4, whilst strong support was found for the null in accordance
with the< 1/3rd cut oﬀ recommendation for the ﬁnal epoch, BF10=0.136.
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the same directional belief) was constructed. The comment manipula-
tion was increased in strength from one second-hand belief to three (all
in the same direction). This was done to improve the rate of manipula-
tion check failures experienced in Experiment 1 by improving the
visibility of the manipulation to participants. Additionally, it increased
the reliability of the communicated belief (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth,
2000; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), as there were now several (suppo-
sedly independent) sources all providing the same preference. As such,
the belief could be interpreted as a trend (hence more likely to be
valid), rather than a one-oﬀ occurrence. Relative to neutral comments,
these manipulation comments were still in the minority, to avoid social
conformity issues.
Secondly, the probabilistic reversal was altered from 80/20 - 20/80
to 70/30 - 30/70. This reduction in the severity of the reversal was
introduced to help reduce possible ceiling eﬀects discussed above due
to the dominant machine (and reversal) being too obvious to both
controls and manipulation groups alike. This change was aimed at
teasing apart possible biasing eﬀects further.
The third change was the introduction of three posterior measures
at the end of the main task, in which participants chose which of the
two machines they preferred (“Which machine do you think is better?”;
binary preference), how conﬁdent they were (0–100%) in that pre-
ference, followed by their estimation of the distribution of better
outcomes between the two machines (“What is the spread of better
outcomes between the two machines?”, from 100% A, through 50/50,
to 100% B on a 100 point scale). The addition of posterior measures
allows for the testing of whether the bias seen in the BiS group in
Experiment 1 that converged with the other groups during phase 1, but
then re-emerged following the reversal is a reﬂection of a truly
consolidated belief. The measures were therefore included as a supple-
mental, exploratory measure to investigate if the contrast eﬀects in the
main (behavioural) dependent variables are found in end-of-sequence
judgements as well (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).
6.1.1. Hypothesis
The hypotheses for Experiment 2 are primarily based on the contrast
code eﬀects found in Experiment 1. Those who receive a belief that is
initially supported (BiS) will choose the machine indicated by the belief
signiﬁcantly more than controls, whilst those in the group that receive
initially undermining evidence (BiU) will not show such a bias and be
no diﬀerent from the control group. Furthermore, with the inclusion of
the posterior probability measures, contrast eﬀects were predicted to
extend to these measures as well.
6.2. Results
6.2.1. Descriptives and processing
Based on the contrast analysis of Experiment 1, a second power
analysis was run using G*power (Faul et al., 2009, 2007) to estimate
sample sizes required for Experiment 2. Converting partial eta squared
values for the contrast code analyses of the three dependent variables
into Cohen's d (Cohen, 1992) eﬀect sizes, using the smallest of these
eﬀect sizes, to detect a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the .05 level, with 80%
power resulted in an average estimated sample size of 90 per group.
Following the same procedure as Experiment 1, the groups sample sizes
were increased by 33% to compensate for those failing manipulation
checks, calculated from the failure rates of Experiment 1, resulting in a
total N of 330. Given the changes to the paradigm, this was conserva-
tively increased by 10% to 360.
Participants were recruited online using MTurk. Those who had
taken part in the previous experiment were ruled out from participat-
ing. The 360 participants recruited were US based, randomized into
either the BiS (121), BiU (122) or control (117) conditions. The average
age was 34.7 years (SD= 11.47) and the sample was 49% female. After
completing the task, all participants were asked a series of ﬁlter
questions to determine whether the comment manipulation had been
remembered. If participants had no recollection of a manipulation
comment (if one had been presented in their condition), they were
removed from subsequent analysis,6 leaving 103 in the BiS group (85%
pass rate, up from 75% in Experiment 1) and 96 in the BiU group (79%
pass rate, up from 59% in experiment 1). The decision to remove those
who failed was taken following the same protocol and reasoning as
Experiment 1.
Having increased the number of comments from one to several, and
reduced the severity of the probability distributions, the drop-out rate
was lower in Experiment 2, although these diﬀerences (both between
groups and between studies) were not signiﬁcant. The following
analyses were conducted using the remaining 316 participants, with
an average age of 34.71 years (SD= 11.41) and 50% female.
6.2.2. Correlates
Locus of Control, age, gender, gambles per week and revised
Paranormal Belief Scale (rPBS) variables were not correlated with any
of the dependent variables.
6.2.3. Choice data
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the reversal point was harder to detect for
all participants, but nevertheless by the point of reversal all groups had
learnt a preference for the dominant machine, and subsequently moved
in the correct direction upon reversal. The proportion of choices in
favour of the initially dominant machine, both overall, and broken
down into pre- (phase 1) and post-reversal (phase 2) proportions were
the key variables of interest once again for running the contrast code
analysis.
To assess whether Experiment 2 replicated the key ﬁndings of
Experiment 1, the same contrast code analysis procedure was con-
ducted for the three conditions (BiS, Control, BiU: 2, −1, −1), along
with pairwise comparisons between groups. The contrast code analysis
of condition on the overall proportion of choices made was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 313) = 13.637, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.042. Along with corroborating
pairwise ANOVA analyses which show the BiS group was signiﬁcantly
higher than controls, F(1, 219) = 15.192, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.065, and
BiU, F(1, 198) = 7.111, p= 0.008, η2 = 0.035, groups, whilst the
diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not signiﬁcant (p= 0.318).
Breaking this down by phase, the proportion of choices in the ﬁrst
phase (grey lines in Fig. 2, prior to reversal point), the contrast code
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 313) = 16.69, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.051. This was
corroborated by pairwise ANOVA showing the BiS group was signiﬁ-
cantly higher than controls, F(1, 219) = 19.993, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.084, and BiU, F(1, 198) = 8.188, p= 0.005, η2 = 0.04, groups,
whilst the diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not signiﬁcant
(p= 0.129).
These eﬀects continued into the second phase (grey lines in Fig. 2,
post reversal point), as the contrast code was again signiﬁcant, F(1,
313) = 5.046, p= 0.025, η2 = 0.016. This was corroborated by pair-
wise ANOVA showing the BiS group was signiﬁcantly higher than the
control group, F(1, 219) = 4.739, p= 0.031, η2 = 0.021, whilst the
diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not signiﬁcant (p= 0.805).
This diﬀerence between the BiU and BiS groups was not signiﬁcant in
phase 2 (p= 0.077), however as the two key comparisons (BiS is
diﬀerent from controls, whilst BiU is not) remain signiﬁcant, the
position of the BiU group proportion (on the BiS group side of the
control group) further supports the notion of the BiU group refuting
their belief.
6 Following the same protocol as Experiment 1, signiﬁcant eﬀects were found for both
the eﬀect of condition on the overall proportion of choices, F(2, 359)=4.76, p=0.009,
η2=0.026, and the contrast coding of the same analysis, F(1, 357)=8.233, p=0.004,
η2=0.023, regardless of manipulation check removal.
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6.2.4. Phase 1 convergence
Following the analysis protocol of Experiment 1, a repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the degree of convergence
in choice proportions over the course of phase 1. The contrast code was
the between-subjects grouping factor, and 10 trial epochs were within-
subjects. The consequent interaction between epoch and grouping was
signiﬁcant, F(2, 313) = 8.941, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.054, indicating a
convergence of the contrast eﬀect over the course of the phase.7
6.2.5. Posteriors
The posterior measure of estimated probability distribution (see
Fig. 3) showed a signiﬁcant contrast code eﬀect of condition, as found
in the above behavioural measures, F(1, 313) = 4.192, p= 0.041,
η2 = 0.013.8
A further series of t-tests revealed a primacy eﬀect, wherein the
initial evidence favouring one machine dominated the reversed evi-
dence in the latter half of the task, in the BiS, t(102) = 5.862,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [5.43, 10.99], control, t(116) = 3.586,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [2.3, 7.99], and BiU, t(95) = 2.129, p= 0.036,
95% CI [0.25, 7.05], groups.
Participant's binary preference posterior measure did not yield a
main eﬀect of condition, but did show strong primacy eﬀects, wherein
the initial evidence favouring one machine dominated the reversed
evidence in the latter half of the task, in BiS, X2(1, N = 103) = 14.767,
p < 0.001, control, X2(1, N = 117) = 9.308, p= 0.002, and BiU,
X2(1, N = 96) = 12.042, p < 0.001, groups. The conﬁdence measure
for the binary preference did not show any signiﬁcant eﬀects of
condition, or order eﬀects.
6.3. Discussion
Replication of the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 demonstrates the
necessity of initial supporting evidence in validating the second-hand
belief, leading to subsequent biases in updating. Similar to the eﬀects
discussed in Experiment 1, phase 1 diﬀerences can be seen as due to
adjustment from initial starting points (as dictated by communicated
belief). However, despite all participants (regardless of group) conver-
ging beyond a probability matching (Edwards, 1961) level (choosing
the dominant option 70% of the time) by the end of phase 1, the
contrast code once again re-emerges in phase 2.
Importantly, when investigating the posterior measures, despite a
general tendency towards primacy amongst all groups, which is not
surprising for an end-of-sequence judgement (Hogarth & Einhorn,
1992), an asymmetry between the primacy in the BiS group as
compared to the other groups existed. This was corroborated by a
replication of the contrast analysis for the posterior probability
estimate. Such an extension lends credence to the argument that the
biasing eﬀect due to consolidating a communicated belief has persistent
eﬀects beyond trial-by-trial choices and into end-of-sequence judge-
ments. Furthermore, such a bias occurred despite all groups witnessing
Fig. 2. Black lines show the within-group 7 trial windowed averages of proportion of choices made in favour of the initially dominant machine as participants move through the 200 trials
(with reversal occurring at 100 trial point), averaged on an individual level, then split into group averages. Grey lines show the averaged proportions of choices for each group, split by
phase. Standard errors for phases are also shown.
Fig. 3. Posterior probability estimate as a percentage of better outcomes. Greater than
50% reﬂects a preference for the initially dominant machine, less than 50% indicates a
preference for the initially sub-optimal machine. Outcomes split by group (*p < 0.05).
7 This was further ratiﬁed by Bayesian ANOVAs conducted on both the ﬁrst and last
epochs, to assess the strength of support for the contrast code in the ﬁrst block in direct
comparison to the assessment of the strength for the null in the ﬁnal epoch. Decisive
evidence was found for the contrast eﬀect in the ﬁrst block, BF10=4.73∗105. In the ﬁnal
epoch, there was no longer support for the contrast eﬀect, but this did not reach the <1/
3rd to be classiﬁed as substantial support for the null, BF10=1.731. However, it should be
noted that a Bayesian ANOVA on the subsequent epoch (ﬁrst epoch post-reversal) does
indicate a reversal in trend from convergence to divergence upon reversal, as strong
evidence is once again found for the contrast eﬀect, BF10=10.41.
8 A Bayesian T-test was conducted to conﬁrm the lack of a diﬀerence between controls
and BiU was not due to insuﬃcient power by looking for strong support of the null (a
Bayes Factor of< 1/3rd). Substantial evidence was found in support of the null,
BF10=0.186.
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the same evidence (due to the presence of counterfactual feedback),
which suggests this diﬀerence is not a product of a diﬀerential in
evidence exposure.
Finally, Experiment 2 replicated the eﬀects found in Experiment 1
using a 70/30 probability reversal, which reduced ceiling eﬀects in the
proportion of choices made within each phase. The second change to
paradigm - including multiple comments indicating the communicated
belief - resulted in a lower proportion of participants failing the
manipulation check and likely attributed to a stronger contrast eﬀect,
in line with models of source trust in advice-taking literature (Siegrist
et al., 2000; Yaniv, 2004), as perceived trust is increased when several
sources indicate the same information, up from a single source.
7. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 set out to extend the eﬀects found in Experiments 1
and 2 into the domain of health decision making. The ﬁrst reason for
this change was to ratify possible claims of generalizability of the
eﬀects in question, by moving outside of a gambling context. Secondly,
in making the transition away from gambling, it was hoped that
improvements could be made in short-term “streak-shooting” noise in
the choice data. In other words, given the aim of the experiments were
to have participants focus on the long-term, overall quality of the two
options available to them, the context of lotteries is conducive to short-
term, fallacious strategies such as gambler's fallacy (Ayton & Fischer,
2004; Barron & Leider, 2010; Jessup &O'Doherty, 2011). Such strate-
gies are based on recent performance, such as assuming that because
one machine has not won recently, then it is “due” for a win. These
strategies are hence, in relation to the overall eﬀects under investiga-
tion, a possible distraction.
Furthermore, by moving into the domain of health, outcomes are
deﬁned as a medicine either “curing” or “failing to cure” the disease in
a particular patient. In Experiments 1 and 2, where outcomes were
variable (number of ball matches) for each machine, and thus compar-
isons between machines had to be based on a calculation of the relative
number of matches between options (e.g., an assessment of whether a
two-ball match is better than 3 sets of one-ball matches).
By simplifying this to a 1 (cure) or 0 (fail to cure) outcome for each
option, one can better assess the role of outcome probability as intrinsic
to the biasing eﬀects in question, having eliminated alternative
elements of computational diﬃculty and ambiguity. In doing so, it is
possible to therefore answer whether probabilistic ambiguity alone is
suﬃcient to sustain previously found eﬀects. The change to binary
outcomes bares a closer parallel to more social implications of these
eﬀects, such as impression formation and stereotyping (Anderson,
1965), wherein evidence is often categorically present or absent (e.g.,
adjective present or absent/high or low).
The ﬁnal advantage of extending these eﬀects into the health
domain is the necessary implication for belief manipulation general-
izability. By altering the context in which evidence is integrated, the
belief itself also necessarily needs to be adapted to ﬁt the new context.
The consequent change in the content of the belief not only speaks
further to the generalizability and robustness of the eﬀects in question,
but further allows for initial inferences in the degree to which beliefs
are processed.
Accordingly, the methods below are a direct extension of
Experiment 2, with the following changes:
7.1. Method
The context for the task was changed from a lottery task in which
participants were required to assess the relative strength of two lottery
machine algorithms, to a health domain in which the participant played
the role of a physician prescribing medicines to patients. In this way,
each trial was a new patient, presenting with the anonymised disease
“Q”. Participants were tasked with assessing the overall eﬃcacy (i.e.
across diﬀerent patients) of two new medicines, anonymized to “K” and
“Z”. The cover story stated that each patient varied by genotype, and
such variance may result in diﬀerent responses to the two medicines.
Such a change in context also required the comment section manipula-
tion to change to reﬂect the health domain, so instead of a manipulation
comment of “Machine A seemed luckier to me” as used in the lottery
Experiments, comments instead reﬂected the medicine options (e.g., “I
think medicine Z was the most eﬀective” and “medicine Z was better
than K.”). In this way, communicated beliefs regarding the options still
reﬂected the unquantiﬁed, directional hypotheses used previously.
As mentioned above, this change in context also allowed for the
response format to change to a stricter, binary set of outcomes (instead
of variable numbers of ball matches). A successful trial was deﬁned as
when the selected medicine “Cured” the disease (with the participant
winning 3 points as a reward), and an unsuccessful trial as when the
selected medicine had “No Eﬀect” (costing the participant 1 point). As
in previous experiments, participants could see the counterfactual
outcomes for each trial (what the outcome for the patient would have
been had they selected the other medicine), and were incentivized with
increasing monetary bonuses for each 50-point boundary they crossed
in earnings throughout the task, as in Experiments 1 and 2. Similarly,
both the number of trial pre- and post-reversal remained the same, with
100 each side, and the probabilities of each option were again 70/30
pre-reversal, and 30/70 post-reversal.
Finally, in the demographics and questionnaire section following
the main task and posteriors, Locus of Control and Revised Paranormal
Belief Scale measures, which had previously failed to yield any
relationships to both behavioural and judgement data, were replaced
by an abbreviated Need for Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).
Given prior literature associating Need for Closure with the propensity
towards engagement, deliberation and entertainment of alternative
hypotheses (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) in individuals, this was
hypothesised to have a potential impact on the biasing eﬀects under
investigation.
7.1.1. Hypothesis
The hypotheses for Experiment 3 are to replicate the contrast eﬀects
found in Experiment 1 and 2, extending these eﬀects into a health
context. Those who receive a belief that is initially supported (BiS) will
choose the medicine indicated by the belief signiﬁcantly more than
controls, whilst those in the group that receive initially undermining
evidence (BiU) will not show such a bias and be no diﬀerent from the
control group. These eﬀects are also hypothesised to extend to posterior
probability estimates,9 replicating Experiment 2.
7.2. Results
7.2.1. Descriptives and processing
Based on the contrast code analysis of Experiment 2, a power
analysis was run using G*power (Faul et al., 2009, 2007) to estimate
sample sizes required for Experiment 3. Converting partial eta squared
values for the contrast code analyses for the three dependent variables
into Cohen's d (Cohen, 1992) eﬀect sizes, using the smallest of these
eﬀect sizes, to detect a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the .05 level, with 80%
power resulted in an average estimated sample size of 80 per group.
Following the same procedure as Experiment 1, the groups sample sizes
were increased by 33% to compensate for those failing manipulation
checks, calculated from the failure rates of Experiment 1, resulting in a
total N of 330. Given the changes to the paradigm, this was conserva-
tively increased by 10% to 360.
Participants were recruited online using MTurk. Those who had
9 In accordance with the context change from lotteries to health, the posterior
probability estimate question changed to “What is the distribution of cures between the
two medicines?”, with a sliding scale from 100% K, though 50/50, to 100% Z.
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taken part in the previous experiment were ruled out from participat-
ing. The 360 participants recruited were US based, randomized into
either the BiS (103), BiU (119) or control (138) conditions. The average
age was 35.52 years (SD= 11.181) and the sample was 47.2% female.
After completing the task, all participants were asked a series of
ﬁlter questions to determine whether the comment manipulation had
been remembered. If participants had no recollection of a manipulation
comment (if one had been presented in their condition), they were
removed from subsequent analysis,10 leaving 77 in the BiS group and 93
in the BiU group. The decision to remove those who failed was taken
following the same protocol and reasoning as Experiment 1.
As expected, the change from showing one comment to several
comments decreased the drop-out rate, although these diﬀerences (both
between groups and between studies) were not signiﬁcant. The follow-
ing analyses were conducted using the remaining 299 participants, with
an average age of 35.37 years (SD= 10.903) and 49.5% female.
7.2.2. Correlates
Need for closure did not correlate or interact with any of the eﬀects
under investigation, but was found to have an impact on the speed of
learning across epochs in the ﬁrst phase. Accordingly, Need for Closure
was assessed in the convergence analysis. Age and gender variables
were not correlated with any of the dependent variables.
7.2.3. Choice data
As can be seen in Fig. 4, the reversal point was harder to detect for
all participants, but nevertheless by the point of reversal all groups had
learnt a preference for the dominant medicine, and subsequently moved
in the correct direction upon reversal. The proportion of choices in
favour of the initially dominant medicine, both overall, and broken
down into pre- (phase 1) and post-reversal (phase 2) proportions were
the key variables of interest once again for running the contrast code
analysis.
To assess whether Experiment 3 replicated the key ﬁndings of
Experiment 2, the same contrast code analysis procedure was con-
ducted for the three conditions (BiS, Control, BiU: 2, −1, −1), along
with pairwise comparisons between groups.
The contrast code analysis of condition on the overall proportion of
choices made was signiﬁcant, F(1, 296) = 8.462, p= 0.004,
η2 = 0.028. Along with corroborating pairwise ANOVA analyses which
show the BiS group was signiﬁcantly higher than controls, F(1, 205)
= 4.859, p= 0.029, η2 = 0.023, and BiU, F(1, 169) = 10.189,
p= 0.002, η2 = 0.058, groups, whilst the diﬀerence between controls
and BiU was not signiﬁcant (p= 0.407).
Breaking this down by phase, the proportion of choices in the ﬁrst
phase (grey lines in Fig. 4, prior to reversal point), the contrast eﬀect
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 296) = 7.441, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.025. This was
corroborated by pairwise ANOVA showing the BiS group was signiﬁ-
cantly higher than controls, F(1, 205) = 7.044, p= 0.009, η2 = 0.034,
and BiU, F(1, 169) = 7.337, p= 0.007, η2 = 0.042, groups, whilst the
diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not signiﬁcant (p= 0.975).
These eﬀects were not continued into the second phase (grey lines in
Fig. 4, post reversal point), as the contrast eﬀect was not signiﬁcant,
p= 0.095. This was explained by a pairwise ANOVA showing the BiS
group was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the control group (p= 0.37).
Whilst the diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not signiﬁcant
(p= 0.293), the diﬀerence between the BiU and BiS groups was
however signiﬁcant in phase 2, F(1, 169) = 4.73, p= 0.031,
η2 = 0.028.
7.2.4. Phase 1 convergence
Following the analysis protocol of Experiment 2, a repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the degree of convergence
in choice proportions over the course of phase 1, controlling for Need
for Closure. The contrast code was the between-subjects grouping
factor, and 10 trial epochs were within-subjects. The consequent
interaction between epoch and grouping was signiﬁcant, F(2, 295)
= 15.471, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.095, indicating a convergence of the
contrast eﬀect over the course of the phase.11
7.2.5. Posteriors
The posterior measure of estimated probability distribution (see
Fig. 5) showed a signiﬁcant contrast eﬀect of condition, as found in the
above behavioural measures, F(1, 296) = 6.641, p= 0.01,
η2 = 0.022.12
This was corroborated by pairwise ANOVA showing the BiS group
was signiﬁcantly higher than controls, F(1, 205) = 4.3, p= 0.039,
η2 = 0.021, and BiU, F(1, 169) = 7.597, p= 0.006, η2 = 0.044,
groups, whilst the diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not
signiﬁcant (p= 0.272).
A further series of t-tests revealed a primacy eﬀect, wherein the
initial evidence favouring one medicine dominated the reversed
evidence in the latter half of the task, in the BiS, t(76) = 4.788,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [4.27, 10.35], and control, t(128) = 2.43,
p= .0016, 95% CI [0.61, 5.96], groups, but not the BiU group
(p= 0.533).
Participant's binary preference posterior measure yielded a main
eﬀect of condition, X2(1, N = 299) = 6.023, p= 0.049, and showed
strong primacy eﬀects, wherein the initial evidence favouring one
medicine dominated the reversed evidence in the latter half of the task,
in BiS, X2(1, N = 77) = 15.909, p < 0.001, and control groups, X2(1,
N = 129) = 4.845, p= 0.028, whilst BiU showed no such eﬀect
(p= 0.351). The conﬁdence measure for the binary preference did
not show any signiﬁcant eﬀects of condition, or order eﬀects.
7.3. Discussion
The successful replication of the overall contrast eﬀect found in both
Experiments 1 and 2 despite the change of domain from gambling to
health, speaks to the generalizability of the eﬀects in question. The
successful use of novel belief manipulation content, novel use of binary
outcome types for experienced evidence, and the medicine prescribing
context further validate the robustness of the biasing eﬀects under
investigation. However, the authors take pains to note that this is not a
perfect replication. Although both overall and phase one choices reﬂect
the patterns seen previously (including the convergence of choices
across phase one), the re-emergence of the contrast eﬀect does not quite
reach signiﬁcance in phase 2. It is however equally important to note
that the contrast eﬀect re-emerged in the posterior probability estimate,
indicating the ﬁnal judgement regarding the options is (just as in
Experiment 2) a consequence of the interaction between belief and
initial evidence.
One likely reason for this failure to replicate in phase 2, is the
change from variable (and thus more computationally complex) out-
comes in the gambling context, to the more obvious binary outcomes of
10 Following the same protocol as Experiment 2, a signiﬁcant eﬀect was found for both
the contrast code analysis of the overall choices, F(1, 356)=5.254, p=0.021, η2=0.015,
and posterior probability estimates, F(1, 356)=4.941, p=0.027, η2=0.014, regardless of
manipulation check removal.
11 This was further ratiﬁed by Bayesian ANOVAs conducted on both the ﬁrst and last
epochs, to assess the strength of support for the contrast eﬀect in the ﬁrst block in direct
comparison to the assessment of the strength for the null in the ﬁnal epoch. Decisive
evidence was found for the contrast eﬀect in the ﬁrst epoch, BF10=9732.711. In the ﬁnal
epoch, there was no longer support for the contrast eﬀect, reaching the < 1/3rd to be
classiﬁed as strong support for the null, BF10=0.265. Both epoch analyses accounted for
the eﬀect of Need for Closure as mentioned in the correlates section.
12 A Bayesian T-test was conducted to conﬁrm the lack of a diﬀerence between controls
and BiU was not due to insuﬃcient power by looking for strong support of the null (a
Bayes Factor of < 1/3rd). Substantial evidence was found in support of the null,
BF10=0.252.
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curing or failing to cure in the health context. This can be seen in visual
inspection of the trend data shown in Fig. 4, wherein the point of
convergence occurs earlier than in Experiment 2 (which is matched on
both probability distribution and trial number), within the ﬁrst half of
the phase, rather than by the end of the phase. Further, the proportion
of choices in all groups is substantially closer to maximisation (with the
latter half of phase one showing all three group averages at about 90%
optimal choices). Both of these trends are indicators that learning which
option is optimal is easier, a situation that was present in Experiment 1
(which suﬀered similar ceiling eﬀects likely due to unambiguous
probability distributions), and successfully remedied via a subsequent
increase in probabilistic ambiguity in Experiment 2. In other words,
when ﬁrst-hand learning is easier (re: less ambiguous evidence,
whether through a reduction in computational complexity by going
from variable to binary outcomes, as in Experiment 3, or through
unambiguous probabilities, as in Experiment 1), the need for and use of
communicated beliefs decreases (Ha &Hoch, 1989; Hoch &Ha, 1986).
Need for Closure was found to play a role in explaining some of the
variance in choice behaviours, primarily in the ﬁrst phase of the
experiment. This ﬁnding ﬁts with the Need for Closure literature and
the role it plays in the length and degree of engagement with the
process of consolidating on a single hypothesis (Webster & Kruglanski,
1994). To put this another way, those high in the need for closure more
quickly came to a conclusion regarding which option to choose for the
remainder of the phase. This ﬁnding provides an innovative demonstra-
tion of the impact individual diﬀerences in Need for Closure can have
on extended evidence integration processes. It should further be noted
that such eﬀects were independent of manipulation condition, suggest-
ing the consequent biasing eﬀects run independently of this dimension.
8. Experiment 4
Experiment 4 set out to replicate the principal ﬁndings of
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, whilst extending them into a reduced trial
format. By reducing the number of trials in each phase, Experiment 4
sought to test the potential limits or thresholds for the consolidation/
refutation eﬀects on belief as consequence of the ﬁrst phase in previous
experiments. By seeking to extend such eﬀects to instances where there
is substantially less evidence to either refute or consolidate the
communicated belief pre-reversal, it becomes possible to address
questions regarding potential memory issues in the longer tasks
contributing to previously found eﬀects. Finally, such a change opens
the avenue for future research into the limitations of previously found
belief-initial evidence interactions.
8.1. Method
The design and procedure of Experiment 4 followed that of
Experiment 3, wherein participants made choices between two medi-
cines in an attempt to discern which is the more eﬀective in curing a
disease, some having been pre-exposed to a belief that indicates one of
the options as superior. This belief is either supported (BiS) or under-
mined (BiU) by the ﬁrst phase of evidence. The probability distribution
of outcomes between the two options starts with one dominant (cures
70% of the time) and the other suboptimal (cures 30% of the time),
before these probabilities then reverse halfway through the task. These
choices are then followed by posterior measures assessing participants'
end-of-sequence, overall judgements regarding the two options. Finally,
these are followed by demographics and the Need for Closure scale.
The principle change in methodology from Experiment 3 to
Experiment 4 was the total number of trial pre- and post-reversal were
halved, resulting in two phases of 50 trials. Such a change also meant
the pay scale for the task needed to be adjusted downwards to reﬂect a
bonus scheme proportional to the reduced length of the task.
Fig. 4. Black lines show the within-group 7 trial windowed averages of proportion of choices made in favour of the initially dominant medicine as participants move through the 200
trials (with reversal occurring at 100 trial point), averaged on an individual level, then split into group averages. Grey lines show the averaged proportions of choices for each group, split
by phase. Standard errors for phases are also shown.
Fig. 5. Posterior probability estimates as a percentage of better outcomes. Greater than
50% reﬂects a preference for the initially dominant medicine, less than 50% indicates a
preference for the initially suboptimal medicine. Outcomes split by group (*p= 0.01).
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8.1.1. Hypothesis
The central hypothesis follows that of Experiments 2 and 3, namely
a replication of the contrast eﬀects found in both choice data and
posterior judgements. To once again spell this out explicitly, those who
receive a belief that is initially supported (BiS) will choose the medicine
indicated by the belief signiﬁcantly more than controls, whilst those in
the group that receive initially undermining evidence (BiU) will not
show such a bias and be no diﬀerent from the control group.
Accordingly, these eﬀects are hypothesised to extend to this reduced
trial format.
8.2. Results
8.2.1. Descriptives and processing
Based on a reduced phase contrast code analysis of Experiment 3, a
power analysis was run using G*power (Faul et al., 2009, 2007) to
estimate sample sizes required for Experiment 3. Converting partial eta
squared values for the contrast code analyses for the three dependent
variables into Cohen's d (Cohen, 1992) eﬀect sizes, using the smallest of
these eﬀect sizes, to detect a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the .05 level, with 80%
power resulted in an average estimated sample size of 80 per group.
Following the same procedure as Experiment 1, the groups sample sizes
were increased by 33% to compensate for those failing manipulation
checks, calculated from the failure rates of Experiment 1, resulting in a
total N of 270.
Participants were recruited online using MTurk. Those who had
taken part in the previous experiment were ruled out from participat-
ing. The 270 participants recruited were US based, randomized into
either the BiS (105), BiU (98) or control (68) conditions. The average
age was 32.44 years (SD= 10.54) and the sample was 39.1% female.
After completing the task, all participants were asked a series of
ﬁlter questions to determine whether the comment manipulation had
been remembered. If participants had no recollection of a manipulation
comment (if one had been presented in their condition), they were
removed from subsequent analysis,13 leaving 91 in the BiS group and 76
in the BiU group. The decision to remove those who failed was taken
following the same protocol and reasoning as Experiment 1.
The following analyses were conducted using the remaining 229
participants, with an average age of 32.24 years (SD= 10.194) and
38.9% female.
8.2.2. Correlates
Need for closure, age and gender variables were not correlated with
any of the dependent variables.
8.2.3. Choice data
As can be seen in Fig. 6, the reversal point was harder to detect for
all participants, but nevertheless by the point of reversal all groups had
learnt a preference for the dominant medicine, and subsequently moved
in the correct direction upon reversal. The proportion of choices in
favour of the initially dominant medicine, both overall, and broken
down into pre- (phase 1) and post-reversal (phase 2) proportions were
the key variables of interest once again for running the contrast code
analysis.
To assess whether Experiment 4 replicated the key ﬁndings of
Experiment 3, the same contrast code analysis procedure was con-
ducted for the three conditions (BiS, Control, BiU: 2, −1, −1), along
with pairwise comparisons between groups.
The contrast code analysis of condition on the overall proportion of
choices made was signiﬁcant, F(1, 226) = 34.675, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.133. Along with corroborating pairwise ANOVA analyses which
show the BiS group was signiﬁcantly higher than controls, F(1, 152)
= 12.833, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.078, and BiU, F(1, 166) = 46.12,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.218, groups, whilst the diﬀerence between controls
and BiU was also signiﬁcant to a lesser degree F(1, 137) = 4.769,
p= 0.031, η2 = 0.034.
Breaking this down by phase, the proportion of choices in the ﬁrst
phase (grey lines in Fig. 6, prior to reversal point), the contrast eﬀect
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 226) = 41.796, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.156. This was
corroborated by pairwise ANOVA showing the BiS group was signiﬁ-
cantly higher than controls, F(1, 152) = 20.682, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.12, and BiU, F(1, 166) = 60.302, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.268,
groups, whilst the diﬀerence between controls and BiU was not
signiﬁcant (p= 0.073).
These eﬀects were continued into the second phase (grey lines in
Fig. 6, post reversal point), as the contrast eﬀect was again signiﬁcant, F
(1, 226) = 10.354, p= 0.001, η2 = 0.044. This was explained by a
pairwise ANOVA showing the BiS group was signiﬁcantly higher than
the BiU group F(1, 166) = 13.688, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.077. However,
the diﬀerence between controls and BiS, and controls and BiU groups
were both not signiﬁcant (p= 0.078, and .131 respectively).
8.2.4. Phase 1 convergence
Following the analysis protocol of Experiment 3, a repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the degree of convergence
in choice proportions over the course of phase 1. The contrast code was
the between-subjects grouping factor, and the ﬁve 10-trial epochs were
the within-subjects factor. The consequent interaction between epoch
and grouping was signiﬁcant, F(2, 226) = 33.191, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.227, indicating a convergence of the contrast eﬀect over the
course of the phase.14
8.2.5. Posteriors
The posterior measure of estimated probability distribution (see
Fig. 7) showed a signiﬁcant contrast eﬀect, as found in the above
behavioural measures, F(1, 226) = 8.460, p= 0.004, η2 = 0.036.15
Pairwise ANOVA showed the BiS was signiﬁcantly higher than the
BiU group, F(1, 166) = 12.849, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.072. The diﬀer-
ences between controls and BiS, and controls and BiU groups were not
signiﬁcant (p= 0.167 and 0.055 respectively).
A further series of t-tests revealed a primacy eﬀect, wherein the
initial evidence favouring one medicine dominated the reversed
evidence in the latter half of the task, in the BiS, t(76) = 4.788,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.814, 14.44], and control, t(128) = 2.43,
p= 0.016, 95% CI [4.04, 11.64], groups, but not the BiU group
(p= 0.533).
Participant's binary preference posterior measure yielded a main
eﬀect of condition, X2(1, N = 229) = 10.626, p= 0.005, and showed
strong primacy eﬀects, wherein the initial evidence favouring one
medicine dominated the reversed evidence in the latter half of the task,
in BiS, X2(1, N = 91) = 40.89, p < 0.001, control, X2(1, N = 62)
= 18.645, p < 0.001, and BiU groups, X2(1, N = 76) = 4.263,
p= 0.039.
The conﬁdence measure for the binary preference showed a
13 Following the same protocol as Experiment 2, a signiﬁcant eﬀect was found for both
the contrast code analysis of the overall choices, F(1, 268)=24.114, p<0.001,
η2=0.083, and posterior probability estimates, F(1, 268)=8.024, p=0.005, η2=0.029,
regardless of manipulation check removal.
14 This was further ratiﬁed by Bayesian ANOVAs conducted on both the ﬁrst and last
epochs, to assess the strength of support for the contrast eﬀect in the ﬁrst block in direct
comparison to the assessment of the strength for the null in the ﬁnal epoch. Decisive
evidence was found for the contrast eﬀect in the ﬁrst epoch, BF10=1.581∗1011. In the
ﬁnal epoch, there was no longer support for the contrast eﬀect, but this did not reach
the< 1/3rd to be classiﬁed as strong support for the null, BF10=2.058. However, it
should be noted that a Bayesian ANOVA on the subsequent epoch (ﬁrst epoch post-
reversal) indicated a reversal in trend from convergence to divergence upon reversal, as
strong evidence is once again found for the contrast eﬀect, BF=6.951.
15 A Bayesian T-test was conducted to assess the null eﬀect between controls and BiU.
Although there was a null eﬀect, BF10=0.997, this did not reach the <1/3rd
recommended Bayes Factor for strong support of the null.
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signiﬁcant contrast eﬀect, F(1, 226) = 6.549, p= 0.011, η2 = 0.028,
which was corroborated by pairwise analyses.
8.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 replicate the eﬀects found in
Experiments, 1, 2, and 3, across all choice measures (overall, phase 1,
and phase 2) and posterior probability estimates. This pattern of results
demonstrates once again the importance of initial evidence in the
validation of a communicated belief, and the subsequent integrative
conﬁrmation bias eﬀects that occur as a consequence of consolidation.
Furthermore, the replication of this pattern in Experiment 4 demon-
strates that the threshold amount of evidence for consolidation or
refutation of a communicated belief is lower than previous experiments
have indicated. Such a ﬁnding raises questions regarding the limitations
of these initial evidence eﬀects for further research. In particular, the
diﬀerences in biasing eﬀects when reducing amount of evidence versus
clarity of evidence.
However, as can be seen from visual inspection of Figs. 6 & 7, for the
second phase choices and posteriors measures, although the contrast
eﬀect is signiﬁcant, the diﬀerence between controls and the BiU group,
although non-signiﬁcant, does not show strong support for the null.
Consequently, this ﬁnding suggests the potential proximity of the
aforementioned threshold for belief refutation.
A further novel ﬁnding from Experiment 4 is the extension of the
contrast eﬀect to posterior conﬁdence. Interestingly, this pattern
demonstrates that those who show the most pronounced bias, i.e. the
BiS group, also retain the highest degree of conﬁdence in their [biased]
choices and judgements.
9. General discussion
Through the use of on-line paradigms, participants played various
lottery gambles and medical prescription tasks, choosing between two
options, experiencing outcomes of both (chosen and counterfactual).
Prior to this, participants were exposed to an on-line comment section
that either contained entirely neutral comments (control group), or
additionally contained a communicated belief regarding one of the two
options being better. These beliefs were either initially supported (BiS)
or undermined (BiU) by the subsequent probabilistic evidence (prob-
abilities then reversed halfway through the task, rendering the options
equally proﬁtable overall). As such, the focus of this research has been
to investigate the role of communicated beliefs in biasing the integra-
tion of evidence. Exploratory analysis from Experiment 1 found that a
communicated belief required initially supporting evidence to procure a
bias: When evidence changed, only those with a supported belief
showed a re-emergence of conﬁrmation bias even though evidence no
longer favoured the belief (ruling out a normative “washing out” eﬀect
of a communicated prior, instead indicating an ongoing, active, biased
integration). This reluctance to abandon the belief was not evident in
participants who receive a belief that was initially undermined (ruling
out conservatism or strong prior explanations). Importantly, all BiU
group participants used in analyses could still remember the belief, and
as such their similarity to controls was not a consequence of forgetting
it. Further, the probabilistic reversal illustrates that all groups were
actively learning throughout (see the sharp change in trend lines post-
reversal in Fig. 1, Section 5.2). That is, as all groups remain sensitive to
the change in probabilities, it is possible to rule out a diﬀerential in
inattentiveness as an explanation of the bias found in the Belief initially
Supported (BiS) group.
These eﬀects were then replicated in Experiment 2, and further
shown to extend beyond choice data to posterior judgements. This
pattern of results was then replicated using a health context
(Experiment 3) and with shorter phases (Experiment 4). Although both
Fig. 6. Black lines show the within-group 7 trial windowed averages of proportion of choices made in favour of the initially dominant medicine as participants move through the 100
trials (with reversal occurring at 50 trial point), averaged on an individual level, then split into group averages. Grey lines show the averaged proportions of choices for each group, split
by phase. Standard errors for phases are also shown.
Fig. 7. Posterior probability estimate as a percentage of better outcomes. Greater than
50% reﬂects a preference for the initially dominant medicine, less than 50% indicates a
preference for the initially suboptimal medicine. Outcomes split by group (*p < 0.01).
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binary preference and probability estimate posteriors showed strong
overall primacy eﬀects, in the latter case the interaction between belief
and initial evidence lead to an exacerbation of the inﬂuence of initial
evidence on the ﬁnal judgements regarding the two options in the
group for which the belief was initially supported. Furthermore, the
design of the tasks makes it unlikely that biasing eﬀects are driven by
directional motivations to conﬁrm the belief (e.g., demand character-
istics). Moreover, the presence of counterfactual evidence assists in
reducing selective exposure explanations.
The extension into the health domain (Experiment 3) highlights the
robustness of the eﬀects given changes to belief content, outcome types
(variable to binary) and decision context (curing patients versus
winning gambles). Such a ﬁnding strengthens the generalizability of
the belief biasing mechanism proposed. Furthermore, the successful
replication of the contrast (testing a diﬀerence between the Belief
initially Supported (BIS) against the remaining groups) in the reduced
trial number format of Experiment 4, speaks to the robustness of the
eﬀect. However, the pattern of results in Experiment 4 also raises some
interesting questions regarding the limitations of a refutation period in
belief-evidence interaction eﬀects. Put another way, the ﬁnding in
Experiment 4 that a linear contrast code is also a good ﬁt for the pattern
of results (i.e. there is starting to be a diﬀerence between controls and
the Belief initially Undermined group) suggests the reduced amount of
phase 1 evidence (100 down to 50 trials) is starting to impact belief
refutation.
In contrast to most studies investigating conﬁrmation bias eﬀects, a
novel manipulation was used in which additional motivations for
conﬁrmation (such as self-concept preservation and authority eﬀects)
were reduced. Such a reduction was due to the anonymous, on-line peer
source of the directional beliefs regarding the two options, along with
the seemingly incidental presentation of such information (no explicit
instruction was given regarding the content of the comment section,
and ﬁlter questions were used to identify and remove any participants
that saw through this manipulation). Additionally, an accuracy incen-
tive (performance-based pay) was used that was independent of (and
antithetical to) belief-adherence motivations. Given the reduction of
these traditional motivational explanations for conﬁrmation bias, the
fact an eﬀect was found regardless points towards an alternative
explanation.
9.1. Conclusions
Rather than motivational explanations, the current ﬁndings are
better explained by an extension of cognitive explanations taken from
research investigating self-generated hypotheses (Fischhoﬀ& Beyth-
Marom, 1983; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). The proposed mechan-
ism behind the subsequent bias is that the communicated belief orients
subsequent evidence as either conﬁrming or contradicting it, in line
with work on the constriction of the hypothesis space
(Fischhoﬀ& Beyth-Marom, 1983; Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998).
To explain further, those who receive a communicated belief start out
with the hypothesis: “either this belief is true, or not”, whilst controls
have no speciﬁc hypothesis to entertain. Such an assertion is supported
by the naïveté of participants to the context in which evidence is
evaluated, distinguishing this ﬁnding from work in which either
evidence exposure (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004;
Yaniv &Milyavsky, 2007) or prior opinion (DeMarzo,
Vayanos, & Zwiebel, 2003; Lord et al., 1979; Pitz, 1969) precedes
second-hand information. This naïveté results in controls (i.e. those
who receive no belief) starting with a neutral prior, whilst belief-
recipients are informed (but not bound by) the communicated belief. In
this way, evidence-exposure alone both forms a new hypothesis in
controls, and validates or refutes communicated beliefs in recipients.
Thus, subsequent deviations in learning can be attributed to the
interaction of a communicated belief with the same evidence (as
controls receive), rather than the additional (unaccounted for) interplay
of prior beliefs and opinions which both communicated information
and evidence integration will both be informed by (i.e. beliefs are not
having to persuade the recipient away from a pre-existing informed
prior).
Further, given the absence of cues to the credibility of the source
(Briñol & Petty, 2009; Hahn et al., 2009), this hypothesis validation is,
by inference, a validation of the source as credible or not. As such,
initial evidence updates both of these likelihoods (the likelihood the
belief is true, and in relation, the likelihood the source is credible),
acting as a consolidation period. As such, those entertaining a hypoth-
esis who experience initially undermining evidence for the belief not
only consider the belief invalid, but the source (by proxy) as unreliable.
In doing so, such individuals match the control group (i.e. a belief that
has not been consolidated is equivalent to starting without a belief).
Alternately, those who receive a belief that is conﬁrmed by initial
evidence would now have a consolidated hypothesis, and evaluate
subsequent evidence in the forwarded integrative account of conﬁrma-
tion bias (Decker et al., 2015; Doll et al., 2009; Klayman, 1988, 1995;
MacDougall, 1906; Staudinger & Büchel, 2013; Whitman et al., 2015).
Such an evaluation stage of communicated knowledge in part ﬁts
within a propositional account of learning, in which the belief (or
proposition) has its truth value either conﬁrmed or refuted (Mitchell
et al., 2009). However, given the interplay shown between accumulated
evidence and communicated propositions, the eﬀects are not readily
explained by propositional or associative accounts in isolation.
The immediate refutation (or consolidation) of the communicated
beliefs in phase one indicates a critical role of initial evidence, which
rather than dominating or being dominated by the communicated
belief, instead interacts with it. The presence of a bias in the BiS group
(relative to the control group) and absence of bias in the BiU group
indicates the belief must ﬁrst be consolidated before biasing eﬀects can
occur beyond initial preferences. This role of initial evidence in either
the consolidation or rejection of communicated beliefs has strong
parallels to primacy eﬀects found in other areas of psychology such
as subjective probability learning (Peterson & DuCharme, 1967), causal
judgements (Dennis & Ahn, 2001; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003), and
impression formation in social psychology (Anderson, 1965; Freund,
Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;
Mann & Ferguson, 2015), where early evidence plays a critical role in
the formation of opinion. However, this work diﬀers from traditional
primacy (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) in one key way: Although in the
current experiments all experimental groups showed traditional pri-
macy eﬀects (as indicated by the overall proportions favouring the
initially dominant option, as well as the posterior measures in Experi-
ments 2, 3, and 4), those who received a communicated belief showed
even greater susceptibility to early evidence (Staudinger & Büchel,
2013). This is demonstrated by the re-emergence of the bias in the
initially supported belief condition (BiS) post-reversal, even after
choices had converged prior to reversal. Further, at the point during
the task of posterior measures, participants had seen the entirety of the
evidence for both options (which were equal overall), yet the same
pattern of bias was still found. This not only demonstrates the
communicated belief had not been diluted by the ﬁrst-hand evidence,
but lends greater support to the potency of the interaction between the
communicated belief and initial evidence, and the proposed consolida-
tion, followed by integrative bias mechanism.
Once a belief had been consolidated, conﬁrmation bias eﬀects were
found despite the presence of 2-sided evidence, mitigating selective
evidence exposure as an explanation for conﬁrmation bias eﬀects
(Doherty &Mynatt, 1990; Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979;
Klayman, 1995; Klayman &Ha, 1987). It is expected however, that in
environments in which the individual can be selective in what they see
(e.g., always selecting to take the medicine, so that the alternative of
the disease disappearing without taking a medicine is never seen), the
consolidation threshold would likely be crossed quicker (Blanco,
Barberia, &Matute, 2014; Doherty et al., 1979; Yarritu,
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Matute, & Vadillo, 2014). Similarly, it is expected that factors that
increase participant's trust in the source of information (of which
increasing the number of anonymous comments was one) will increase
the degree of belief uptake (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004),
along with factors that provide supplementary motivations for con-
ﬁrmation (Kunda, 1990).
9.2. Limitations
Despite the presentation of 2-sided evidence, in principle we cannot
rule out a selective attention explanation, wherein people attended
more to evidence that supported their belief, while missing the contra-
dictory information. Such selective attention could therefore be con-
sidered a form of positive test strategy (Doherty et al., 1979; Klayman,
1988; Navarro & Perfors, 2011). Nevertheless, if a form of attentional
selectivity to evidence were the mechanism at work in our current
experiments, one might expect delayed learning post-reversal in the BiS
group, whereby it would take a larger number of trials before choice
proportions started moving away from their phase 1 choice proportions.
Instead all groups rapidly moved away from their phase 1 proportion of
choices upon reversal. Furthermore, similar delayed learning would be
expected to amplify the eﬀect of the prior in the BiU group during phase
1. To the contrary, we found a rapid negation of belief dependent on
initial evidence. In other words, if participants were selectively attend-
ing to one of the options, negative outcomes for this option might in
isolation be interpreted by the participant as short-term ﬂuctuations
(and thus not be worth switching away from). However, in the case of
attending to both options, the negative outcomes in the selected option
would be seen to co-occur with the counterfactual positive outcomes in
the alternative, more rapidly indicating a change in the choice
environment (resulting in a more immediate change of selected option),
which is in line with the trends in choice data for all experiments.
Although we cannot fully rule out selective attention in our current
research, follow up lab studies could employ eye-tracking to assess
what evidence participants are attending to, detecting possible asym-
metries.
It is also important to note that eﬀect sizes in the earlier experiments
in the present paper are not large. However, it should be noted that as
the methodology progresses through to latter experiments, eﬀect sizes
continue to increase. Such a trend is likely attributable to reducing
sources of variance (e.g., from a gambling context that may invite more
speculation and short-term ﬂuctuations, to a more stable medical
context with simpler outcomes, and from longer to shorter phases).
Furthermore, given the purpose of the experiments presented within
the present work has primarily been to make a theoretical point, and
the paradigm itself is admittedly noisy, the small eﬀect sizes may be an
underestimation of real world instances of the biasing eﬀects demon-
strated. Further research is, however, needed to determine the extent of
such a bias.
Two limitations pertaining to this work bear particular relevance for
the extension of research investigating communicated belief eﬀects.
Firstly, when trying to ascertain whether an incidental belief has been
noticed by participants, the use of a memory based manipulation check
does carry a limitation: the criterion for passing applies greater scrutiny
to the manipulation groups than the control group. In other words, an
inattentive manipulation group participant would have been picked up
by failing to remember the communicated belief, whilst those in the
control group (who may be similarly inattentive), when answering that
they had not seen anything, would have been marked as correct. This
could result in an asymmetry in the number of (and quality) of
participants in each group. However, as indicated within each experi-
ment, when including all participants, the main eﬀects did remain (just
with greater variance), and further investigations on manipulation
check failures found them no diﬀerent from the control group.
Importantly, as mentioned previously, this check (and removal of
“forgetters”) provided insight into the remaining similarity between
controls and the BiU group used in analysis, showing this was not due to
those in the BiU group forgetting the manipulation by the time the
reversal had occurred.
Secondly, the use of MTurk has known shortcomings, notably the
lack of experimental control (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013),
although several studies have shown strong replications of eﬀects
found in laboratory experiments using the site (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). The
advantage of such a method is its greater ecological validity, as
participants not only show better representation of demographics
relative to the majority of psychological study populations (Henrich,
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). From the context of demand character-
istics as an additional, unwanted motivation for belief conﬁrmation, the
fact participants did not see the manipulation as experimentally driven
added real world applicability, and distinguishes this work from more
artiﬁcial, lab-based assessments of integrative conﬁrmation bias
(Staudinger & Büchel, 2013). Further, there is a growing relevance in
having a communicated belief manipulation that uses an on-line
“comment section” in its natural setting, given such a context represents
an ever-expanding and abundant source of communicated beliefs in the
modern world.
9.3. Implications
Work in instruction eﬀects has typically been lab-based, focusing on
the altering of automatic processes via instruction (Doll et al., 2009;
Mertens & De Houwer, 2016; Roswarski & Proctor, 2003; Van Dessel
et al., 2015, 2016) through explicit experimenter inﬂuence. We argue
that typical instruction inﬂuences are often rich in supplementary social
explanations (such as demand characteristics). In this way, by high-
lighting and controlling such inﬂuences (e.g., through anonymous,
rather than experimenter sources; placing accuracy incentives against
belief-maintenance (instruction-based) motivations) we seek to add to
this growing literature. Further, we seek to stress the critical impact of
initial evidence in the adoption and maintenance of instruction-
congruent behaviour.
The instruction-based biasing eﬀects discussed in this work have
further implications in more applied domains. For example, work in
stereotyping and impression formation has shown sensitivity to early
evidence in the formation of negative assessments of character
(Anderson, 1965). The eﬀects found here suggest that the combination
of a communicated belief (for example, a negative stereotype) and
random ﬂuctuations in early evidence (i.e. there will be a portion of
recipients who happen to receive initial conﬁrmation of this belief),
results in an asymmetry that may help explain such beliefs prevalence
despite their inaccuracy.
Similarly, research into placebo eﬀects, for instance, relies on the
patient's belief that a treatment will work, in spite of (unknown to the
patient) the absence of a medically active ingredient. Typically, this
research has investigated possible cues (setting, verbal suggestions),
motivations (such as demand characteristics from doctor to patient) and
“active agents” (such as caﬀeine) used to mimic a medical side eﬀect
(Wickramasekera, 1980) as highly impactful to the placebo eﬀect
(Wager & Atlas, 2015). The implication of the current research is to
focus on providing initially supporting evidence to increase placebo
eﬃcacy. For example, by deploying treatments that start with a
medically active component, initially supporting evidence (e.g., by
decreasing symptoms) is provided for the belief of the patient that (s)he
is in the treatment condition. Once the belief is consolidated the
medically active component can be phased out of treatment in favour
of a pure placebo, whilst retaining eﬃcacy. Unfortunately, such initial
sensitivity, when combined with short-term, random ﬂuctuations, may
also facilitate placebo responses in the case of various pseudo-scientiﬁc
medical practices, such as homeopathy. Such eﬀects also have ready
application to other areas of research where there is an interplay of
beliefs (or “priors”) and evidence, including consumer research
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(Ha &Hoch, 1989; Hoch &Ha, 1986), decision making (Nurek et al.,
2014), causal learning (Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015; Yu & Lagnado,
2012).
In summary, the present paper demonstrates that when the truth
value of a communicated belief is uncertain, people use early experi-
ences to validate the belief leading to an asymmetry in the integration of
evidence. While the literatures on persuasion and learning from
sequential evidence have evolved rather separately, the present re-
search demonstrates that looking at the way communicated believes
and experienced evidence interact may be a fruitful way of forwarding
our knowledge of how (erroneous) action-outcome believes are formed.
Appendix A. Lottery experiment trial feedback screen
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